The Effects of Market Reform on Maize Marketing Margins in South Africa: An Empirical Study by Traub, Lulama Ndibongo & Jayne, Thomas S.
  1
The Effects of Market Reform on Maize Marketing Margins in South 


















Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the International Association of 






AFFILIATIONS: Lulama Ndibongo Traub (South Africa/USA) and T.S. Jayne (USA) 
are, respectively, Visiting Research Specialist and Professor, International Development, 






T . S .   J a y n e           L u l a m a   T r a u b  
216A Agricultural Hall          2409 E. Jolly Rd, Apt #2 
Michigan  State  University      Lansing,  MI  48910 
East  Lansing,  MI  48824       
 
 
Copyright 2006 by Lulama Ndibongo Traub and T.S. Jayne.  All rights reserved.  Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.  2
1. Introduction 
 
  Throughout the world, the major share of staple food costs to the consumer is 
typically accounted for by marketing costs.  The maize-based agricultural economies of 
Southern Africa are no exception:  in most of the region, farm-gate maize prices account 
for roughly 30 to 40 percent of the total value of commercial maize meal.  This implies 
that cost reduction in the marketing system can transmit potentially major benefits to both 
consumers and farmers. 
  In South Africa, starting in the mid-1980s, internal pressures from within the 
maize industry led to a series of reforms designed to reduce government￿s role in the 
sector and rely increasingly on market forces.  Prior to these reforms, maize meal prices 
and marketing margins for millers and retailers were among the highest in the Southern 
Africa region (Jayne et al., 1999).  In 1997, maize and maize meal prices were 
deregulated after decades of price control by the government.  This article determines the 
effect of market reform on the size of maize milling/retail margins in South Africa.  This 
objective is addressed by estimating alternative models for representing structural change 
in monthly maize milling/retailing margins, applying alternative estimation processes, 
and time-periods.  The next section presents the marketing margins models estimated in 
the analysis.  Then the data and variables used in the models are described, the estimation 
procedures used explained, and the model results interpreted. The paper concludes with 
an overall summary of key findings and identifies salient issues for future research on 
maize marketing and food security in South Africa. 
2. The Model 
 
Agricultural economists have developed various models of agricultural marketing 
margins beginning with Waugh (1964) and Gardner (1975).  Tomek and Myers (1993)   3
show how many of these models produce quite similar reduced form specifications (see 
also Lyons and Thompson, 1993). We start with a general reduced form data generating 




 + Ut   (1) 
 
here, MMt is the difference between the retail price of maize meal and millers’ purchase 
price of maize grain in month t, modified by grain-to-meal extraction rates.  We refer to 
this margin as the ‘‘wholesale-to-retail’’ margin. Xt
*
 includes all exogenous variables 
affecting this marketing margin, and Ut is an identically and independently distributed 
error term. 
Not all of the Xt
*
 variables can be identified because of the lack of observable 
data.  Therefore Xt
*β i
*




 = Xtβ i + Htα i   (2) 
 
where Xt contains the observable data and Ht the unobservable data. We can now write 
the data generating process as: 




Vt = Htα i + Ut     (4) 
 
is the Wold representation of the stochastic component of Htα i and Ut. Any deterministic 
mean, trend, or seasonal component of Htα i can be incorporated in the intercept, trend or 
seasonal component of Xt.   
The variables in Xt would normally include exogenous components of marketing 
costs (e.g. labor wages, transport rates, etc) as well as exogenous factors commonly 
found in structural models of maize supply and demand, such as rainfall, categorical   4
variables to account for potential seasonality, and macroeconomic variables.  Time trends 
are often included as regressors to account for slow-moving processes such as changes in 
technology.  Finally, we must develop a representation of marketing and pricing 
deregulation to measure its impact on margins. Assuming a linear relationship between 
the marketing margin and the independent variables, equation (3) can be expressed as: 
MMt = δ 0 + Xt β i + δ 1REFORMt + δ 2Tt + Σ
11
m=1 γ iDmt + vt    (5) 
 
The exogenous explanatory variables contained in the X vector include: labor costs 
lagged by one period; real exchange rates between the Rand and the US dollar, modified 
by differential inflation rates; an index of macroeconomic risk lagged one period; and a 
rainfall index based on the relevant maize growing season. T is a time trend to capture 
slow-moving trends, D is a vector of eleven monthly dummy variables, and REFORM is 
a variable capturing structural change in the maize marketing system. The simplest 
representation of REFORM is a categorical variable taking on a value of zero during the 
pre-reform period and a value of one afterward. The coefficient δ 1 measures the 
difference in mean marketing margins between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
All prices were adjusted by the 2000 consumer price index. 
Alternate specifications can allow for changes in both the mean level of margins 
over time as well as the trend in the margins between the two periods. One such 
specification is: 
MMt = δ 0 + Xt β i + δ 1REFORMt + δ 2Tt + δ 3REFORM(Tt-TR) + Σ
11
m=1 γ iDmt + vt   (6) 
 
Equation (6) is a piecewise linear regression model imposing the restriction that there be 
no discontinuous change in margins at the point of market reform (TR). In this model, the 
estimated margin prior to market reform reduces to: 
E(MMt) = δ 0 + Xt β i + δ 2Tt + Σ
11
m=1 γ iDmt     (7)   5
 
where the monthly trend in the level of the margins is δ 2 and the intercept is δ 0.  After 
reform, REFORM=1 and hence the estimated milling/retailing margin at time t is: 
E(MMt) = (δ 0 + δ 1 - δ 3Tr) + Xt β i + (δ 2  + δ 3)Tt + Σ
11
m=1 γ iDmt   (8) 
 
We examined the potential non-stationarity of the data, which could lead to problems of 
I(1) cointegration. In conducting Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots on the 
inflation-adjusted prices and other variables in the model, we rejected the hypothesis of 
unit roots at the 5% level for wholesale-to-retail margins, the real exchange rate, and the 
rainfall index, and at the 1% level for real wage rates and exchange rate volatility. 
3. Data and Variable Construction 
 
Milling/retail margin (MM): The wholesale-to-retail marketing margin is a 
processing plus retailing margin. The formula used to estimate the wholesale-to-retail 
maize margin, following Jayne, et al. (1994), is: 
MMt = Prt -- - Pwt * z + [(z-1)*Pbt]   (9) 
 
where Prt equals the retail price of maize meal at time t, Pwt is the wholesale price of the 
maize grain at time t, z represents the average extraction rate of 1.80 tons of grain used to 
produce one ton of meal, and Pbt is the value of the residual maize by-product that is sold 
to agro-industries as input. In the margin computations used in this analysis, z is 1.8 and 
Pbt is approximated as 70% of the wholesale maize price in month t, based on information 
from sources in the maize milling industry.  
Exogenous variables:  The average wages and salary measures for the 
manufacturing sector within South Africa, as well as exchange rate and CPI data come 
from Statistics South Africa.  Real exchange rate volatility is defined as the squared 
deviation between the current and lagged exchange rate values, (Et -- - Et-1)
2.   A rainfall   6
index, weighted by the share of maize production by province, is available from the 
South African Weather Service.  The weather index is constant within each marketing 
year and varying across marketing years. 
Marketing and price policy change: To examine the robustness of our findings, 
we report two alternative methods of modeling the structural change that accompanied 
full price deregulation of maize and maize meal products in May 1997. These alternate 
models were (a) the inclusion of an intercept shift variable equaling zero before May 
1997 and one afterward, as in equation (5); and (b) a piecewise linear regression 
approach restricting a discontinuous change in margin levels at the time of reform, as in 
equation (6). 
Estimation Period: To examine the sensitivity of model results to recent events in 
Southern Africa, we estimate equations (5) and (6) using both the full sample period 
(May 1976 to September 2003) and a truncated sample period, May 1976 to April 2001.   
The latter sample period is used to the possibility that the results could be affected by the 
2002/03 drought and episodes of substantial exchange rate volatility, which occurred near 
the end of the full sample period for which data is available.   
4. Estimation Procedure 
 
When Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) method of estimation is applied to both our 
reduced form linear equations, it was found that the wholesale-to-retail margin model 
exhibited both serially correlated error terms and heteroskedasticity. We used two 
alternate procedures to correct for this. First, when error autocorrelation was found to be 
AR(1), serial correlation was modeled and corrected for through a weighted least squares 
AR(1) procedure, Feasible General Least Squares estimation.   7
We estimated the equation by the standard Prais-Winsten method of estimation, 
providing standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. The resulting Feasible 
General Least Squares estimators are asymptotically efficient and all the standard errors 
and test statistics from the Prais-Winsten method are asymptotically valid. 
When serially correlated errors were found to be AR(2) or higher, we use the 
Newey-West (NW) serial correlated robust inferences after OLS. The NW procedure has 
become more popular in recent years because it is intended to provide standard errors that 
are robust to fairly arbitrary forms of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
(Wooldridge, 2000).  The serial correlation-robust standard errors are typically higher 
than the usual OLS standard errors when there is serial correlation. Lag length selection 
procedures indicated a need for up to two lags for the May 1976-April 2001 estimations 
and up to four lags for the May 1976-September 2003 period. 
5. Results 
 
The first column of Table 1 presents the results of the OLS/NW estimation results 
for equation (5), in which the categorical variable REFORM measures the change in 
mean wholesale-to-retail margins after price deregulation in 1997. Most notably, the 
deregulation variable has a highly significant positive coefficient, indicating that the 
conditional mean of the maize mill/retail margin increased after the deregulation of prices 
by R358 per ton during the May 1997 to April 2001 period, and by R470 per ton during 
the May 1997 to September 2003 period. These figures represent a 29 and 40 percent 
increase over mean inflation-adjusted milling/retailing margins during the 1976 to 1997 
period of controlled pricing. Over and above this finding, the results in Table 1 also show 
a very gradual upward trend in maize processing/retail margins over the entire sample 
period of roughly 1 Rand per month.   8
Table 2 shows the piecewise linear regression results of equation (6).  This model 
allows for a shift in the mean level of milling/retailing margins as well as a shift in the 
rate of growth of the margin.  The OLS/Newey-West and FGLS estimations show again a 
fairly consistent picture with respect to the effects of maize market reform on maize 
milling/retailing margins.  Both sets of models, after computing standard errors robust to 
serial correlation, show statistically insignificant immediate effects on the margin after 
the initiation of price decontrol and market reform, with coefficient estimates ranging 
from -49 to +245 Rand per ton.  However, all of the models presented in Table 2 show a 
steep increase over time in the mill/retail margin.  
The monthly increase in the margin ranges from R9.52 per ton for the May 1976-
September 2003 OLS/NW estimation, to R16.71 and R15.34 per ton for the OLS/NW 
and FGLS estimations for the May 1976-April 2001 sample period. This implies a steady 
increase in the conditional mean of the mill/retail margin of 388 to 551 Rand per ton after 
a three-year period -- - a 29 to 42 percent increase over mean mill/retail margins during the 
Phase 1 and II periods in which prices were controlled. The finding of a rising trajectory 
in maize mill/retail margins is statistically significant across all models at the 99.5 level 
of statistical significance or higher. 
By contrast, trend growth in the mill/retail margin prior to price decontrol was 
very close to zero in the OLS/NW runs, and +1.79 Rand per ton per month in the FGLS 
estimation for the shorter sample period. This contrasts markedly with the estimated 
sharp increase in the size of the mill/retail margin after the 1997 decontrol of maize meal 
prices.  
To simulate the dynamics of maize meal price movement under the counterfactual 
policy conditions of continued price control, we predicted Pr using equation (9), based on   9
model results from equation (5) OLS with Newey-West corrected standard errors over the 
full sample period (simulation 1), and from equation (6) (simulation 2).  In both 
simulations, the variable REFORM was set to zero over the entire sample period.  Figure 
1 plots the price movement of actual maize meal retail prices against the two simulated 
retail price series.  Both simulated ‘‘no reform/no price decontrol’’ prices show a close 
tracking of actual prices during the pre-control period, and then show that historical 
prices rose substantially above the simulated prices starting with the decontrol of maize 
meal prices in 1997. 
From the results of these alternative model specifications, estimation techniques, 
and sample periods, a consistent picture emerges. The implementation of market reform 
and price decontrol has led to an increase in real retail maize meal prices.  While our 
statistical results do not reveal the reason for the rise in margins after the decontrol of 
maize marketing and pricing, these results are consistent with descriptive analyses by 
Chabane (2002), Watkinson and Makgetla (2002), and Diamant (2003) indicating high 
levels of concentration in the milling and especially the retailing stage of the food system.  
Given the importance of maize meal in the diets of South African consumers, further 
investigation of the causes of rising real maize marketing margins and of options to 






This study determines the effect of price decontrol of maize meal prices in 1997 
on the maize milling/retailing margins in South Africa.  To assess the robustness of our   10
findings, we applied two alternate model specifications of market reform using two 
different sample periods and two different estimation techniques. 
In virtually all models, the results indicate that inflation-adjusted margins 
accruing to millers and retailers has risen 29 to 42 percent between 1997 and 2003, after 
controlling for disturbances in weather, wages, exchange rate levels and volatility.  
Furthermore there appears to be a rising trend in the margin size over time.  Simulations 
indicate that the deregulation of maize meal prices has caused a 16 to 20% increase in the 
mean retail price of maize meal since 1997.  Maize meal prices in South Africa remain 
the highest of all maize producing countries in the region, even though mean wholesale 
prices in South Africa are relatively low compared to its regional neighbors.  Following 
on widespread concerns about the competitiveness of the food industry in South Africa 
(see COSATU, 2002; and Watkinson and Makgetla, 2002), the study indicates the need 
for more detailed understanding of how market structure, public policies and/or practices 
of marketing firms may be affecting competition and possible barriers to entry for new 
milling and retailing firms.    11
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Table 1: Maize Milling/Retailing Margins, Equation (5), OLS with Newey-West 
(NW) Serial Correlation-Robust Standard Errors 
  -------------------------------------------- Sample period ------------------------------------------- 
Variables         May 1976 ￿ April 2001                                   May 1976 ￿ September 2003 
   OLS  NW lag(1) NW lag(2) OLS NW lag(1)  NW lag(4)
Rainfall index  -0.049  -0.049 -0.049 0.008 0.008  0.008
   (-0.567)  (-0.466) (-0.394) (0.080) (0.053)  (0.038)
Wagest-1  0.171 0.171 0.171 0.029 0.029  0.029
   (3.384)**  (2.157)* (1.879) (0.557) (0.343)  (0.244)
ER Volatility t-1  -183.597 -183.597 -183.597 -178.417 -178.417  -178.417
   (-0.834)  (-1.195) (-1.160) (-3.079)** (-4.231)**  (-3.882)**
RER t-1  -27.761 -27.761 -27.761 -58.306 -58.306  -58.306
   (-3.370)**  (-2.734)** (-2.284)* (-6.450)** (-3.212)**  (-2.277)*
Trend 1.336  1.336 1.336 1.034 1.034  1.034
   (5.259)**  (5.287)** (4.538)** (3.746)** (2.191)*  (1.562)
Reform  358.038  358.038 358.038 480.59 480.59  480.59
   (8.587)**  (3.799)** (3.186)** (9.138)** (4.666)**  (3.165)**
June   32.045  32.045 32.045 35.672 35.672  35.672
   (0.692)  (1.023) (1.173) (0.622) (0.887)  (1.223)
July   23.597  23.597 23.597 31.735 31.735  31.735
   (0.509)  (0.523) (0.587) (0.553) (0.550)  (0.747)
Aug   10.262  10.262 10.262 30.282 30.282  30.282
   (0.218)  (0.204) (0.200) (0.524) (0.532)  (0.607)
Sept -29.402  -29.402 -29.402 5.115 5.115  5.115
   (-0.628)  (-0.575) (-0.560) (0.088) (0.086)  (0.086)
Oct -36.053  -36.053 -36.053 -45.1 -45.1  -45.1
   (-0.772)  (-0.700) (-0.680) (-0.773) (-0.766)  (-0.758)
Nov -55.465  -55.465 -55.465 -55.354 -55.354  -55.354
   (-1.177)  (-1.080) (-1.035) (-0.941) (-0.957)  (-0.941)
Dec -96.043  -96.043 -96.043 -79.156 -79.156  -79.156
   (-1.973)  (-1.515) (-1.443) (-1.309) (-1.178)  (-1.115)
Jan   -199.427  -199.427 -199.427 -63.496 -63.496  -63.496
   (-3.132)**  (-2.208)* (-1.977)* (-0.832) (-0.710)  (-0.565)
Feb -59.833  -59.833 -59.833 -63.477 -63.477  -63.477
   (-1.281)  (-1.413) (-1.392) (-1.089) (-0.997)  (-1.161)
Mar -67.886  -67.886 -67.886 -76.320 -76.320  -76.320
   (-1.465)  (-1.794) (-1.910) (-1.317) (-1.190)  (-1.571)
Apr   -88.543  -88.543 -88.543 -64.772 -64.772  -64.772
   (-1.894)  (-2.258)* (-2.273)* (-1.111) (-1.270)  (-1.462)
Constant 665.554  665.554 665.554 1419.162 1419.162  1419.162
   (3.668)**  (2.012)* (1.732) (6.517)** (3.839)**  (2.678)**
DW 0.2770  0.2926  
R
2
  0.7939  0.7309  
Observations 299  299 299 328 328  328
Note: * = 5% level of significance, and ** = 1% level of significance   14
Table 2:  Maize Milling/Retailing Margins, Equation (6), OLS with Newey-West 
Serial Correlation-Robust Standard Errors and FGLS Estimation 
  ----------------------------------------------------Sample period ------------------------------------------------- 
Variables     May 1976 ￿ April 2001                    May 1976 ￿ September 2003 
   OLS  NW lag(1) FGLS OLS NW lag(1)  NW lag(4)
Rainfall Index  -0.175  -0.175 0.188 0.164 0.164  0.164
   (-2.373)*  (-1.655) (-1.125) (1.712) (1.214)  (0.885)
Wages t-1  0.077 0.077 0.033 0.107 0.107  0.107
   (1.987)*  (1.425) (1.525) (2.212)* (1.593)  (1.224)
ER Volatility t-1  -36.670 -36.670 -57.246 -193.025 -193.025  -193.025
   (-0.197)  (-0.248) (-0.802) (-3.649)** (-3.914)**  (-3.412)**
RExch t-1  -48.096 -48.096 -25.146 -91.813 -91.813  -91.813
   (-6.675)**  (-8.306)** (-3.017)** (-9.913)** (-5.455)**  (3.974)**
Trend 0.983  0.983 1.790 -0.115 -0.115  -0.115
   (4.533)**  (4.721)** (3.625)** (-0.397) (-0.270)  (-0.202)
Reform  65.111  65.111 -49.590 245.243 245.243  245.243
   (1.461)  (0.696) (-0.641) (4.350)** (2.400)*  (1.698)
Reform*(Tt-T253)  16.712  16.712 15.344 9.519 9.519  9.519
   (10.708)**  (5.269)** (3.229)** (7.956)** (4.017)**  (2.862)**
June   31.097  31.097 25.302 37.824 37.824  37.824
   (0.796)  (1.007) (1.767) (0.723) (1.072)  (1.441)
July   24.640  24.640 19.397 32.164 32.164  32.164
   (0.630)  (0.622) (0.916) (0.614) (0.651)  (0.851)
Aug   17.876  17.876 18.362 21.465 21.465  21.465
   (0.451)  (0.446) (0.797) (0.407) (0.433)  (0.482)
Sept -18.808  -18.808 -19.143 -3.999 -3.999  -3.999
   (-0.476)  (-0.470) (-0.709) (-0.076) (-0.081)  (-0.080)
Oct -30.844  -30.844 -29.736 -45.380 -45.380  -45.380
   (-0.783)  (-0.739) (-1.063) (-0.852) (-0.846)  (-0.837)
Nov -47.497  -47.497 -42.797 -62.483 -62.483  -62.483
   (-1.195)  (-1.129) (-1.504) (-1.163) (-1.191)  (-1.162)
Dec -76.365  -76.365 -64.796 -98.870 -98.870  -98.870
   (-1.857)  (-1.542) (-2.166)* (-1.789) (-1.617)  (-1.529)
Jan   -121.806  -121.806 -81.067 -128.528 -128.528  -128.528
   (-2.247)*  (-1.839) (-2.173)* (-1.834) (-1.686)  (-1.438)
Feb -66.442  -66.442 -60.414 -72.730 -72.730  -72.730
   (-1.686)  (-1.628) (-1.890) (-1.367) (-1.258)  (-1.455)
Mar -86.772  -86.772 -81.854 -84.164 -84.164  -84.164
   (-2.217)*  (-2.148)* (-2.622)** (-1.592) (-1.470)  (-1.925)
Apr   -99.523  -99.523 -90.656 -80.616 -80.616  -80.616
   (-2.522)*  (-2.578)* (-2.967)** (-1.515) (-1.828)  (-2.115)*
Constant 1283.599  1283.599 1186.304 1444.232 1444.232  1444.232
   (7.844)**  (6.110)** (8.776)** (7.267)** (5.096)**  (3.739)**
DW 0.3138  1.9940 0.3790  
R
2
  0.8538 0.7767  
Observations 299  299 299 328 328  328
Note: * = 5% level of significance, and ** = 1% level of significance 
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Figure 1.  Maize Meal Retail Prices:  Actual vs. Simulated Under No Price 
























































Simulation 1:  estimated retail price of maize meal assuming that market reform/price decontrol did not occur 
(generated from mill/retail margins based on equation 5 using the Newey-West lag(4) method of estimation).    
 
Simulation 2:  estimated retail price of maize meal if market reform/price decontrol did not occur (generated from 
mill/retail margins based on equation 6 using the Newey-West lag(4) method of estimation).  
 
In both cases, the variable REFORM was set to zero throughout the entire period from May 1976 to September 
2003.  